

General Homer Lea, "The Legacy of Commodore Perry," *North American*, June 1913: 741-760.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the heritage of nations is the legacy of individuals; hence it is that we say such-and-such men are the benefactors of their race. Great men can produce great nations, but great nations do not necessarily produce great men; hence it is that the most insignificant of tribes have given to the world the greatest men, and the greatest of nations have gone down because of the lack of these individuals.

When the heritage of a nation is the legacy of an individual, that inheritance has invariably a twofold potentiality. It is like the Temple of Janus, beneficent and terrible. The legacy of Columbus was a world; the legacy of Louis XVI., the French Revolution; the legacy of Confucius, universal tolerance; the legacy of Saint Augustine, universal inquisition; the legacy of Washington, this Republic; the legacy of Commodore Perry, Japan.

That there should have been erected by the Japanese on a promontory overlooking Yeddo Bay a monument to the memory of Commodore Perry is not other than an expression of their gratitude to a man who, unbeknownst to himself, left to that poor relation of mankind an inheritance greater than Alexander left to his generals or Caesar to the Roman Empire—the heritage of the Pacific.

This sea alone constitutes more than one-third the entire surface of the globe, while upon its shores are to be found two-thirds of the human race and three-fourths of the undeveloped wealth of the world. The peculiar value to Japan in possessing this ocean is in its capacity to dominate it. The geographical position of Japan is in the strategic center of this half of the world. The development of mechanical means in communication and transportation gives to Japan an ability to traverse and to communicate with the most remote places in this vast region with greater ease and rapidity than a century ago it took to maintain communication between London and Edinburgh or between Washington and Boston.

The other heir to this inheritance is the United States. But the value of the Pacific to this Republic does not belong to the immediate present; hence it is that this nation overlooks its true worth. The necessity of America's possessing the Pacific rests in political conditions that are just now beginning to make themselves manifest: (1) the elimination of time and space by mechanical invention which reduces the entire surface of the world to a small and compact area; (2) in exact proportion as this area is reduced nations are crowded together, and as nations are crowded together there must go on a continual elimination of the lesser States. The progression of warfare, starting from the combat of the individual, has gone on in constant progression toward the combat of larger units; hence, as at one time it was the individual, then the family, then a collection of families, then tribes, then a collection of tribes, that constituted the nuclei of combat, so it has developed through varying degrees of petty States until it has now reached what we might call a combat of composite States. Prior to the Napoleonic wars the whole of Europe was divided into many hundreds of petty kingdoms. Out of their amalgamation has come the German Empire, the Italian Kingdom, Austria, and Russia. We are now about to pass to the final stage of combat, that of races.

The elimination of smaller political entities will continue with the same unvarying certitude. In this elimination of nationalities and their amalgamation with the more

powerful nations is alone to be found the diminution of war, since every independent state is an embryo of combat. The failure to realize this fact causes those strange theorists—arbitrationists—to see in the growing infrequency of war an increasing morality of mankind, whereas this diminution has come about through perfectly natural causes. As you decrease the number of independent states you decrease the probabilities of war; and, as the elimination and absorption of a state is only through conflict, we can truly say that by war alone will war be eliminated.

Each year decreases the width of both the Atlantic and the Pacific. Each year decreases the power of minor states and augments that of the greater nations, so that the time is not far distant when we can give expression to this law: that whenever the political and military power of Europe passes under the control of a single race, and that race controls the Atlantic, the sovereignty of the Western Hemisphere passes over to it. Should the militancy of Germany continue to expand, and the militant deterioration of America go on to the degree that is now existent, the suzerainty of this Republic over the Western Hemisphere will in due time be lost.

Should Asia pass, in a military and political sense, under the suzerainty of a single power, and that power should control the Pacific, American suzerainty over the western part of the Western Hemisphere must pass to the Asiatic. On the other hand, if this Republic would, under these circumstances, maintain military supremacy over the Pacific as against Asian powers, it could extend its suzerainty to those shores and give to the people dwelling there those principles it deems so beneficial to mankind.

Whatever nation secures the dominion of the Pacific and maintains it has reached the sphere and possibility of world-empire. No nation that does not first possess this sovereignty can aspire to the hope of that greatness; and unless the republic secures that dominion now, it is lost to it forever. While that loss may not be appreciated by this generation, there will come generations who will look back upon those now living with the same contempt as races of men have regarded the folly of Esau, who sold his heritage for a mess of pottage.

To Japan, however, this heritage has to do with the present to as vital a degree as it can possibly affect it in the future. The interests of these two nations are acutely convergent, and it is only in the degree of speed by which they are moving along their respective lines to that point of contact which is war, that we discover a difference. In the United States there is little or no propulsion, for so absolutely does the present crowd aside future considerations in the affairs of the nation, that it can be said that while the movement of Japan in the Pacific is predetermined, definite, and irrevocable, that of the United States is hardly more than an uncertain drifting upon the indolent currents of this vast sea, where destiny has cast them.

The position of Japan in the Pacific has its historical counterparts. In their careers and in their destiny is to be found the career and destiny of this old yet now nation. Japan is to the Pacific what ancient Tyre was to the Mediterranean. What England is in the Atlantic, Japan must be in the Pacific, or, as other insular kingdoms, be destroyed by those continental powers whose seas it does not control and whose ports it fails to command.

While the inheritance of the Pacific is as vital to this Republic as to Japan, its value, being of the future, loses its significance through the natural improvidence of the

Republic. Yet it will be only after the passage of a few years that the pressure of the Pacific will rest as heavily upon this neglectful nation as it does today upon Japan.

The destiny of states, their welfare, and plans made for their greatness alone concern the future. It is not the statesman, but the politician who agitates himself over the present; and it is not even the politician, but the quackery of him that keeps the nation seething in domestic legislation, in the mockeries of reform, and in the mad lie of politics, diverting it from true greatness and wrecking it in the midst of its vain contentment. The politician is one of the curses God did not lay upon Egypt. He reserved this for America.

National greatness is alone determinate by the provisions for the future. While the erection of a building can only succeed the completion of its foundation, these must be preceded by the perception of the completed edifice. So it is in the building of nations; aspirations and plans belong to the future, and must precede the creation of all national greatness, even to the laying of its foundations.

Had the Mississippi Valley remained French, Texas and the Pacific coast Spanish, Hawaii independent, Alaska Russian, or this nation divided into two Republics, the greatness that now belongs to it would have been no more than those day-dreams of great men that halt momentarily upon this earth and pass on into oblivion.

The Pacific bears to this Republic the same relationship as did the acquisition of those great territories that now constitute its domains. At the time when they were secured there existed no need for them, and their acquirement alone concerned the future. There is a resemblance between the sovereignty of these continental possessions and the future sovereignty of the Pacific.

The possession of these territories made possible the greatness of this Republic. The possession of the Pacific makes possible its survival.

In so far as the ultimate future of Japan and the United States is concerned, their claims to the inheritance of the Pacific rest not alone on lines of national progress, but survival. That this identical character should not be apparent is due to the indeterminate character of this Republic's future needs and the decisiveness of Japan's present necessity.

On the one hand, we have this nation, whose sovereignty is unconcernedly extended over one-fourth of the world; on the other hand, an Empire with a population more than half that of this Republic, restricted to one two-hundred-and-fiftieth part of the earth's surface. In one nation we find opulence, in the other poverty; in one the old vanity of possessions, in the other the old craft of hunger. This nation has arrogance without arms, Japan both arms and contempt. Here are shopkeepers; there are soldiers. In Japan only the Emperor stands between a soldier and God. In America precedence begins the other way: between a soldier and hell only some Bunker Hills intervene, and a few bridges of Concord to save him from utter damnation.

It has long been known that armies are divisible into three psychological elements: one-third is naturally brave, one-third is cowardly, and the other third indeterminate. The problem, therefore, in an army is to bring the indecisive third into the ranks of the brave. This is the purport of discipline. If by giving over the army to those who are valorous, and if by the exercise of military training they bring over the indeterminate third to the ranks of the brave, then an actual army has been created. These two-thirds carry along the cowardly third by compulsion. With the final third there is no

hope. God has already abandoned them. And it is folly for man to bolster them up with false shoulders and mustaches.

This same law applies, in time of peace, to the peoples of all nations; to this nation and to Japan. But due to the difference in the ethical ideals of these two States, the same artificial distinction results as would be the case between two armies in one of which the warlike third held sway and the other in which the cowardly third ruled. In Japan the nation is dominated by militancy; the military third, controlling the indecisive third, practically eliminates the non-military element.

In this Republic the opposite condition exists, and we must pass over it in sad and bitter silence lest we sully the forgotten memory of those heroes whose blood cemented together the foundations of this Republic.

Such, then, is the spirit that animates these two claimants to the inheritance of the Pacific as they make their way to the bar of that court which shall adjust their claims.

Mankind invariably views the process of law and the adjustment of human differences with prejudice, and because of this it is commonly said that no man is justified in acting as his own counsel.

The error of this is manifest; yet, in its application to that old composite individual, the nation, the same condition exists, with this exception, that in addition to prejudice is passion, with passion, hate, and with these a wilful, mad disdain.

Nothing can be more deplorable than this error.

Warfare is only a phase of national progress, to be no more regarded with hatred or passion than should an individual look with the same feeling upon the vicissitudes that mark his progress from childhood to the grave.

The adjudication of this inheritance of the Pacific must pass through two courts: the Court of the Sea and the Court of the Land; the first is preliminary, the second final. The judgment of the Court of the Sea will either be decisive or will appertain to the final judgment in no way.

A statistical comparison between the naval forces of the United States and Japan is apparently plain to the public mind, though the public neither knows nor cares anything about it. To those who study it, it is an enigma when it is not an obsession. This enigmatical character is clue to the falsity of the relationship it bears to the actual struggle.

Comparative Table of American and Japanese Navies (1910)
First-Class Battleships

	<u>Displacement</u>	<u>Big Guns</u>	<u>Horse-power</u>	<u>Speed, Knots</u>
<i>South Carolina</i>	16,000	8	16,000	18.5
<i>Kashima</i>	16,400	8	18,000	18
<i>Michigan</i>	16,000	8	16,000	18.5
<i>Katori</i>	16,400	8	18,000	18
<i>Delaware</i>	20,000	10	25,000	21
<i>Satsuma</i>	18,800	14	18,500	20
<i>North Dakota</i>	20,000	10	25,000	21
<i>Aki</i>	19,000	14	25,000	20.5
<i>Utah*</i>	21,825	12	-----	---

<i>Kawachi*</i>	21,000	14	-----	---
<i>Florida*</i>	21,825	12	-----	---
<i>Setsu*</i>	21,000	14	-----	---
<i>Wyoming*</i>	26,000	12	-----	---
Unnamed*	21,000	14	-----	---
<i>Arkansas*</i>	26,000	12	-----	---
Unnamed*	21,000	14	-----	---
<i>Kansas</i>	16,000	4	16,500	18
<i>Shikishima</i>	14,850	4	14,500	18
<i>Vermont</i>	16,000	4	16,500	18
<i>Ashai</i>	15,000	4	15,000	18
<i>Minnesota</i>	16,000	4	16,500	18
<i>Mikasa</i>	15,362	4	15,000	18
<i>New Hampshire</i>	16,000	4	16,500	18
<i>Iwani</i>	13,566	4	16,500	18
<i>Maine</i>	12,585	4	16,500	18
<i>Hizen</i>	12,700	4	16,000	18
<i>Missouri</i>	12,585	4	16,000	18
<i>Sagami</i>	12,684	4	14,000	19
<i>Ohio</i>	12,585	4	16,000	18
<i>Suwo</i>	12,674	4	14,500	19
<i>New Jersey</i>	14,948	10	19,000	19
<i>Virginia</i>	14,948	10	19,000	19
<i>Georgia</i>	14,948	10	19,000	19
<i>Nebraska</i>	14,948	10	19,000	19
<i>Rhode Island</i>	14,948	10	19,000	19
<i>Louisiana</i>	16,000	10	16,500	18
<i>Connecticut</i>	16,000	10	16,500	18
<i>Idaho</i>	13,000	12	10,000	17
<i>Mississippi</i>	13,000	12	10,000	17

*Building

Excess of First-Class American Battleships

Ships	9
Big Guns	20

Armored Cruisers

United States, first class	10—big guns, 16
Japan, first class	15—big guns, 41

Excess of First-Class Japanese Armored Cruisers

Ships	5
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Big guns	25
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Torpedo Craft

United States torpedo-boats	24
Japanese torpedo-boats	95
United States torpedo destroyers	36
Japanese torpedo destroyers	62
Excess of Japanese torpedo craft	97

Recapitulation of the Four Elements of Combat

United States excess first-class battleships	9
Japanese excess of first-class armored cruisers	5
Japanese excess of big guns	4
Japanese excess of torpedo craft	97

By these tables it is seen that that overwhelming superiority of the American navy does not exist. In fact it is very difficult to say if both navies were ranged in a single sea, which would be superior. In warfare the catalogue of ships and the enumeration of the implements of war never stand in constant relation to those other characteristics that more actually determine the eventual consummation of international struggles.

War is like prayer—it alone concerns man. A cathedral does not add to prayer, nor do weapons increase the militancy of nations. These two conditions are elemental. There enters also into the conduct of war, both by land and by sea, the Earth. The Earth plays a greater part in the eventual determination of war than does man himself. The Earth can circumscribe man in his combat; all that man can do is to borrow. The Earth is an enemy or an ally. It aids the defense or the offense. It alone determines its allegiance. Such is the case in the naval war on the Pacific. The Japanese have gods that are gods of the land and of the sea. These gods they have propitiated, and the Earth has come to their rescue. This struggle for the Pacific is in the Pacific. The naval forces and the naval bases of the United States are sixteen thousand miles from the combative sphere of their coastline. The navies and armies and peoples and gods of Japan are in the center of it. The determinate factor in naval warfare, as on land, is strategic. In this instance it might be said that this strategic condition determines the consummation of the approaching struggle. The efficiency of a fleet diminishes or is augmented as the distance from its main base to the theater of war is lengthened or diminished. The area of all naval efficiency is determined by the multiplicity, dispersion, and capacity of naval bases, together with a merchant marine sufficient to meet the maximum demand of the navy in war. Without these depots and merchant marine a navy decreases in efficiency as it increases in size. Due to the naval policy of this Republic, the Atlantic fleet, once in the Atlantic at the beginning of a war, must remain glued to its Atlantic bases or to the radii of its steaming capacity from these bases.

The fleets of the United States and Japan in the Pacific are:

<u>United States</u>	<u>Japan</u>
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Battleships	—	15
Armored cruisers	10	15
Torpedo craft	12	157
Big guns	10	169
Time for the Atlantic fleet to reach San Francisco in peace.		120 days
Time for the Japanese fleet to reach San Francisco in peace.....		19 days
Time for the Atlantic fleet with supply-ships in war.....		180 days
Time for the Japanese fleet with transports in war.....		30 days

By this table we see that Japan possesses, in a naval sense, the tentative naval control of the Pacific. This is due to the fact that the time elapsing from the landing of the Japanese upon the Pacific coast to the time that the Atlantic fleet might enter its waters is sufficient for the complete seizure by land of the Pacific coast. It will be seen later on that by the time the American fleet enters the Pacific it will look across a waste of waters in which there does not remain a single American port of call—an expanse of waters as portentous and forbidding as they appeared to Magellan some centuries ago.

Should the United States undertake the folly of dividing its fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans the elimination of the American navy might be considered as completed. If the American second-class battleships should be taken as first-class, and there should be made an equable division between the Atlantic and the Pacific, then in relation to the Atlantic fleet France would be:

- Fifty per cent, stronger in big guns.
- One hundred per cent, stronger in armored cruisers.
- Four hundred per cent, stronger in destroyers.
- Twenty-five hundred per cent, stronger in torpedo-boats.

Germany would be:

- One hundred and twenty per cent, stronger in big guns.
- One hundred per cent, stronger in armored cruisers.
- Five hundred per cent, stronger in destroyers.
- Four hundred per cent, stronger in torpedo-boats.

England would be:

- Four hundred and fifty per cent, stronger in big guns.
- Six hundred per cent, stronger in armored cruisers.
- Twelve hundred per cent, stronger in destroyers.
- Nine hundred per cent, stronger in torpedo-boats.

In relation to the Pacific fleet Japan would be:

- One hundred per cent, stronger in big guns.
- One hundred mid twenty per cent, stronger in armored cruisers.
- Four hundred per cent, stronger in destroyers.

Five hundred per cent, stronger in torpedo-boats.

If the United States is to consider its navy as a decisive factor in the defense of this heritage of the Pacific and the continental states on the borders of that ocean, then its naval policy must be radically changed, and the number of its ships in the Pacific determined by the naval strength of the strongest Pacific power plus that number of ships which are necessary to overcome the strategic advantages adherent to the other power; plus also the erection and dispersion of naval bases in all of its Pacific possessions, and a creation of land forces that are capable of protecting these bases from land attack. In this age of great vessels and great speed vast armies can accompany fleets, and temporary control of the sea gives temporary control of undefended landings which with imperceptible rapidity pass to a state of permanency.

An error that frequently manifests itself is the failure of nations to differentiate between the instruments of war and the limitations of their use. In one war we find that, should a combatant achieve certain success through one of its arms as over the use of others, nations rush to increase that arm even to the neglect of the balance, failing to realize that it might have been the environment of the theater of war that determined the especial advantage of that particular means of combat. The character of warfare in South Africa was not applicable to Asia, to America, or to Europe. Yet for the time being it affected them all.

So it is in regard to navies. Some nations place their dependence too much upon them, and for no other reason than because another great power, whose naval necessities may be acute and its greatness based upon naval supremacy, regards naval war as its primary means of offense and defense.

A navy in most, cases can never be anything more than an adjunct to the land forces of a nation. Wars cannot be won through naval achievements alone. The loss of a navy has no effect on the fighting capacity of a nation, nor upon its government, or resources. To be victorious in a decisive sense of the word, the resources or the government of the enemy must be destroyed or controlled to such a degree that the nation is incapable of war. Navies cannot accomplish this. It is reserved for the land forces.

We have seen that, in the struggle for the inheritance of the Pacific, the present conditions are such that the American navy can play no part, and the American nation must depend upon its armies not alone for victory, but for the preservation of the integrity of the nation. So we shall now enter upon the consideration of land warfare, its purposes, progress, and consummation.

In warfare an overwhelming advantage accrues to that combatant who is able to force the theater of war into the other contestant's territory, which is quite contrary to that old nonsense of seeking to fight near one's base. The devastation of the theater of war goes on concurrently with the progress of the war. With this destruction is lessened proportionately the combative ability of the nation in whose territory is located this area of conflict. Hence in a war between Japan and the United States, if it were possible for the United States to make Japan the battlefield instead of this continent, the war would be more than half won and the ruin of it unfelt.

The determination of the locality of this theater of war depends on four conditions:

1. The temporary control of the sea.
 - (a) Belongs to Japan.
2. Capacity to transport, troops.
 - (a) Capacity of the United States to transport troops in a single voyage, 15,000.
 - (b) Capacity of Japan to transport troops in a single voyage, 200,000.
3. Size of the mobile army.
 - (a) American field army at the outbreak of war, 82,000.
 - (b) Japanese field army at the outbreak of war, 250,000.
4. Military capacity.
 - (a) American army in United States, inclusive of militia, 114,000.
 - (b) Japanese army in Japan, inclusive of reserves, 1,500,000.

By this we see that the determination of the theater of war rests entirely with Japan. The Philippine Islands will play no part, because they are strategically occupied the moment war is declared on account of their proximity to Japan. To place troops in them would be a diversion entirely outside of the real theater of operations. The Hawaiian Islands in a similar manner fall under Japanese sovereignty immediately on the declaration of war. This is due to reasons other than those that control the Philippines.

“Japanese immigration into Hawaii has been political rather than economic, and is divided into three distinct political decades, as determined by two factors:

1. American Pacific expansion.
 - (a) The establishment of the Hawaiian Republic.
 - (b) The annexation of Hawaii.
 - (c) The conquest of the Philippines.
2. Japanese political development.
 - (a) Protest of Japan against annexation of Hawaii.
 - (b) Japanese victory over China.
 - (c) Japanese victory over Russia.
 - (d) Anglo-Japanese alliance.

In the first political decade, 1884-1896, there occurred:

1. The overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy and the establishment of the American republic.
2. Japan’s protest against annexation.
3. Japan’s victory over China; the elimination of that nation from the Pacific, and the beginning of Japan’s political development as a Pacific power.

Simultaneous with these events the Japanese population in Hawaii increased from 116 in 1884 to 22,329 in 1896. In the second political decade, 1896-1900, there occurred:

1. The annexation of Hawaii.
2. The conquest of the Philippines.
3. The development of the Japanese army and navy.

Simultaneous with these events the Japanese population increased from 22,329 in 1896 to 61,115 in 1900.

In the third political decade, 1900-1908, there occurred:

1. Japan's victory over Russia, the elimination of that nation in the Pacific and Japan's increased development as a Pacific power.
2. The Anglo-Japanese alliance and Japan's advent as a world power.
3. Unprecedented development of the Japanese army and navy.

Simultaneous with these events Japanese immigration into the Hawaiian Islands from 1900 to 1908 has been 65,708. The departures during this period were 42,313. The military unfit have in this manner been supplanted by the veterans of the great war, and the military occupation of Hawaii tentatively accomplished."* [*The Valor of Ignorance*]

In this manner we find that the theater of war is relegated to the Pacific coast, Washington, Oregon, and California.

The army of Japan is based upon universal and compulsory service. This service extends from the end of the age of twenty and continues until forty. All those capable of carrying arms are divided into two classes: the "fit" and the "absolutely fit," but it is only from the "absolutely fit" that the army is constructed. While military training is part of the school training of all Japanese, it is at the age of twenty that the "absolutely fit" enter the regular army, where they serve for three years in all arms except the infantry, which is for two; then they serve for five years in the first reserve, called the "Yobi." They are then transferred to the "Kobi," in which they serve for ten years. At the end of their Kobi service, which is in their thirty-eighth year, they pass into the Kokumin, where they serve for two years and eight months, completing their total of twenty years. In addition to this there is a supplementary reserve called the "Hoju." It is composed of the balance of the "absolutely fit" not required for the first line. They serve in the Hoju for seven years four months. They are called out first for ninety days' training and subsequent trainings of sixty days. They then pass to the Kobi, where they serve ten years, then to the Kokumin, and complete their service of twenty years. This Hoju is used for making good the waste of war.

The field army of Japan consists of some twenty divisions. These include the guard. There are two independent cavalry brigades, three independent brigades of field artillery, each of twelve batteries, three independent divisions of mountain-guns, and four or more divisions of heavy artillery, each of twenty-four guns. The war strength of a division is 25,000 men. At the present time the total strength of the mobile field army is about 700,000 men, with reserves sufficient to bring it up, if necessary, to a million and a half.

Concerning the American army, we will use only those figures found in the recent report of the Secretary of War and the chief-of-staff, which the sensitive nature of Congress was unable to accept.

By this we find that, in addition to the staff, the American army is composed of fifteen regiments of cavalry, six regiments of field artillery, thirty regiments of infantry, three battalions of engineers, and one hundred and seventy companies of coast artillery.

This gives a total combatant force of 64,000 officers and men. If we deduct the coast artillery we find that the entire balance is less than two divisions of the Japanese army.

The regular army is distributed as follows: 32,500 of the mobile forces are in the United States, 14,500 of the mobile forces are in the insular possessions and Alaska; 16,200 coast artillery are in the United States, 800 are abroad.

In addition to these regular forces, the Secretary of War estimates the available militia to be 86,300 combatant officers and men. The total forces, therefore, in the United States, inclusive of the militia, are 114,500.

The Secretary of War states:

“This force has not the proper proportion of infantry, cavalry, field artillery, engineers, or sanitary troops; it is not fully equipped for field service; it is, with exception of parts of the militia, entirely lacking in organization into higher tactical units of brigades and divisions.”

In modern warfare the first essential to success, after the theater of war has been determined upon, is to reach that locality first. The time required can and should always be known prior to the outbreak of war. This is determined by three definite conditions: First, the assembling of the army; second, the degree of preparedness to take the field; third, the length of time required to transport the forces to the theater of combat.

In assembling the forces of the United States, small as they are, there exists a complex condition of affairs. The regular army of the United States is distributed among one hundred and fifty posts. The militia are scattered throughout forty-nine States and in more than three hundred different geographical localities. These must all be gotten together and supplied with field equipment for the actual purposes of war, which they do not now possess. They must be organized into brigades, and brigade staffs organized, of which not even the nuclei exist. Divisions must be formed, and division staffs; new artillery regiments must be constructed, horses bought and trained, and innumerable other conditions of actual war met and adjusted before these forces can even make their way across America to the Pacific coast.

We should say, after careful study of this question, that it is not possible for these 114,000 men to be placed in brigade and divisional organizations and equipped so that they could intelligently participate in a pitched battle under four months. It is true that in six weeks they might be herded to the front, but in so far as modern military combat is concerned they would be no better than a mob; and though that mob did possess the courage and patriotism of the Gracchi, unlike the Gracchi their deeds would bring them no glory.

Japan, on the other hand, is governed by entirely different conditions. There exists at all times a standing army of over a quarter of a million men, ready to take the field, completely equipped in a single day. For the mobilization of the rest of the forces, it is simplified by two conditions: (1) the compactness of Japan, being not as large as the State of California; (2) the Empire is divided into military districts corresponding with the divisions of the army, and each district is the unit of administration as well as territorial command. Each division receives its recruits from its own district, so that in addition to its standing army Japan can within a week call to its colors an additional half-million men

absolutely equipped, administered, and as perfect as any army in the world, and as ready to enter into a pitched battle upon the day of its mobilization as a year subsequent.

When the theater of war, as in this case, is distant from the center of mobilization of both combatants, the capacity of the means of transportation becomes of vital importance.

In the United States we find that the major portion of the American forces is cast of the Mississippi River—that is to say, between two and three thousand miles from the theater of conflict. They must be transported, after they have been mobilized, by railroads, the difficulty of which is at best very great. When, however, the railroads are under private ownership and vast stretches of territory exist, as in the western part of the Union, through which these troops must pass, the difficulty increases. And when, in addition to this, we find that the entire population of these States is dependent upon the use of these railways to secure means of livelihood and to dispose of its products, the difficulty becomes even greater than it is possible to imagine.

For example, we noted at one time that in the transportation of two hundred and ten men from two companies of coast artillery to the coast, seven sleeping-cars and two baggage-cars were required. Multiply this to 134,000 men, and for each car used in the transportation of men add three additional cars for munitions, artillery, transport, equipment, commissary, horses, mules, wagons, etc., and the magnitude of the task becomes apparent. In war, however, when these 114,000 men must be increased to a million or two million, it is readily seen that the abandonment of the West along certain lines of railway is possible, and their eventual confiscation by the government for the use of military purposes alone is inevitable.

These American roads are quite the reverse of the Russian-Siberian Railway, and it is in this difference of conditions that belong those elements of weakness characteristic of the American railways when given over to war. In the Russo-Japanese War the Siberian road was not only the property of the Russian Government, manned by its employees and a staff whose education and training had been devoted to the handling of troops, but it was unhindered by local traffic or by great areas of dependent population.

The capacity of Japan to transport troops to the United States, and the rapidity with which she can do it, results in this strange paradox: that, in a military sense, Japan is closer to the Pacific coast than is that portion of the United States from whence must come the men and the means with which to make war.

At one time the sea was regarded as being a protection against invasion. But under modern means of marine transportation this condition is reversed, and the sea affords the easiest and quickest way of invading an alien land, provided that the nation possesses armies and ships, as in the case of Japan.

After the American army has been assembled it would require forty-five days to transport the whole of it to a specific theater of war on the Pacific coast. The reason for this is that these armies are tied to the lines of railway. For instance, it would be impossible to transport troops to central or southern California by the northern railways, or to Washington and Oregon by the Santa Fé or Southern Pacific, since on reaching the coast and running parallel to it they would be traveling fifteen hundred miles parallel to the enemy's lines of attack and by a single line of railroad. It must further be remembered that the size of the American defending army is not determined by any arbitrary rules at Washington, but by the number of troops composing the invading army. Moreover, these

troops must reach the vicinity of the theater of war simultaneously. They must enter the area of conflict as a compact body. This, if attempted after war has been declared, is an impossibility. They come in dribblets.

In marine transportation these conditions are reversed. The invading forces can select any point on the coast and their expedition disembark as a compact whole, whether it be one hundred or two hundred thousand men.

It is said that Japan possesses a thousand sea-going vessels. The following table, comprising forty vessels capable of carrying one hundred and twenty-five thousand men and of making the voyage in less than twenty-five days, will be sufficient:

Name	Tonnage	Troop Capacity Officers and Men
<i>Tenyo Maru</i>	14,000	4,600
<i>Chiyo Maru</i>	14,000	4,600
<i>Shinyo Maru</i>	14,000	4,600
<i>Tocoma Maru</i>	11,500	3,800
<i>Seattle Maru</i>	11,500	3,800
<i>Chicago Maru</i>	11,500	3,800
<i>Panama Maru</i>	11,500	3,800
<i>Mexico Maru</i>	11,500	3,800
<i>Canada Maru</i>	11,500	3,800
<i>Kumo Maru</i>	8,600	3,594
<i>Hirano Maru</i>	8,600	3,594
<i>Miyazaka Maru</i>	8,600	3,594
<i>Atsuta Maru</i>	8,000	3,594
<i>Kituno Maru</i>	8,000	3,594
<i>Mishima Maru</i>	8,000	3,594
<i>Tango Maru</i>	7,463	3,168
<i>Hitachi Maru</i>	6,716	2,886
<i>Aki Maru</i>	6,444	2,842
<i>Shimano Maru</i>	6,388	2,916
<i>Iyo Maru</i>	6,320	2,965
<i>Awa Maru</i>	6,309	2,854
<i>Kaga Maru</i>	6,301	2,872
<i>Wakasa Maru</i>	6,265	2,717
<i>Bingo Maru</i>	6,247	2,805
<i>Sado Maru</i>	6,227	2,740
<i>Inaba Maru</i>	6,189	2,816
<i>Kanagawa Maru</i>	6,170	2,832
<i>Kakata Maru</i>	6,161	2,415
<i>Tamba Maru</i>	6,134	2,794
<i>Kamakura Maru</i>	6,126	2,670
<i>Sanuki Maru</i>	6,112	2,700
<i>Kawachi Maru</i>	6,101	2,532
<i>Hongkong Maru</i>	6,000	2,600
<i>America Maru</i>	6,000	2,600

<i>Nippon Maru</i>	6,000	2,600
<i>Tosa Maru</i>	5,823	2,885
<i>Nikko Maru</i>	5,539	2,400
<i>Kumano Maru</i>	6,976	2,396
<i>Ceylon Maru</i>	5,668	2,300
<i>Riojun Maru</i>	4,896	2,840
Troop capacity.....		126,419

We have before called attention to the degree the configuration of the earth plays in the wars of man. We have shown that, relative to the naval struggle between the United States and Japan, the strategic situation is so vastly in favor of the Japanese Empire that, in conjunction with the policy of the American Government the naval supremacy of the Pacific, rests with Japan, though upon the vast sea not a gun is fired. So now in regard to the land warfare, we again witness the strange coincidence of the strategic situation being so overwhelmingly in favor of the Asian Empire that if the military policy of this nation is continued in the future as in the past, we can say that Japan will overwhelm this Republic on the Pacific coast with greater ease and with less hardship than ever, in modern times, one nation has overcome another.

Let us assume that there are three arcs of invasion; in other words, there are three distinct theaters of war. Between the landing-places of those three zones and their arcs of defense exist great natural bases capable of supplying manifold the armies that would be necessary to secure these States. The combined area of the three Pacific coast States is equal approximately to that of France and Prussia and composes the richest portion of the United States. Together they are more than two and a half times larger than the Empire of Japan. For them to maintain an additional Japanese population of even two or three millions would have no effect upon their resources.

Immediately east of these three bases, which constructively are at Portland, Sacramento, and Los Angeles, facing mountains and desert, are the Japanese lines of defense. On the north flank exists a double arc, one defending Washington and having Spokane as its center, the other defending Oregon and having Umatilla, Pasco, Walla Walla, and Pendleton as its center. The defense of the Japanese middle strategic zone has its center at Reno, its right center on Walker River, and its left center north of Plumus Junction. The arc of defense of the Japanese right flank has San Jacinto Cañon on the extreme right, Sangus Cañon on the extreme left, and the Cajon in the center.

On the Japanese left or northern flank we have the following strategic conditions: both positions are situated in a fertile country, while to the east of them are great uninhabitable mountains. To their main base it is less than four hundred miles, while the American main base is over fifteen hundred. If the American commander wished to transfer forces from the Spokane field of operations to the Oregon field of operations it would be necessary for the troops to traverse, over a single line of railway, through a mountainous and sparsely settled country, about thirteen hundred miles. The Japanese changing front on the same lines would have but one hundred and forty-nine miles to traverse over three railways.

The line of defense of the Japanese center is one hundred and fifty-four miles from their base in the Sacramento Valley, while the American field base situated at Salt Lake is five hundred and seventy-eight miles distant over a desert and sparsely settled

country. The Japanese lines encompass the most fertile valley of Nevada, while the American lines are thrown back upon the desolate wastes of Carson Sink, their right flank resting on Black Rock and Smoke Creek deserts, their left on barren mountains.

On the right or southern flank, if the American commander wished to withdraw forces from the Cajon Pass and reinforce those at San Jacinto, it would be necessary for his troops to traverse more than one thousand miles of desert on a single line of railway. The Japanese, to transfer on the same front, but on interior lines, have only forty miles.

The American forces attacking the Japanese southern flank at the Cajon, rest on the Mojave Desert, and are two hundred and forty-six miles from a sufficient supply of water; attacking the San Jacinto, they rest on the Conchilla Desert, and are one hundred and thirty-six miles from water. Some military authorities estimate that, under modern conditions of warfare, to make a frontal attack upon an intrenched army, sheltered behind semi-permanent works, requires a proportion of three to one; others state that it requires five to one. It is obvious that the Japanese left flank cannot be turned strategically because it is protected by the Canadian boundary; the right flank cannot be strategically turned because it is protected by the Mexican boundary.

The American armies will, therefore, be forced to make a strategically frontal attack, which, owing to the peculiar geographical position occupied by the Japanese, must result in a tactical frontal attack. Hence, to say that it will require three Americans to one Japanese to attack them in these positions is taking the lowest estimate that would be supported by any military authority.

Should Japan occupy each of these three strategic zones with approximately two hundred thousand men, or six hundred thousand in all, it would require one million eight hundred thousand Americans to make the attack—one million eight hundred thousand Americans as fully equipped, disciplined, trained, and officered as the Japanese. They must conquer deserts, assault vast barren mountain-ranges; and not until they have overcome the hostility of these savage lands does the struggle begin.

Concerning this struggle we shall say nothing.